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CONSTITUTIONAL REVISIONJUDICIAL SELECTION-THE "MISSOURI PLAN"
FOR NEW MEXICO?
In 1933, a bill was introduced in the New Mexico legislature providing for election of judges on a nonpartisan ballot. The bill failed
to pass.'
In 1935, following revision of the California judiciary the year
before, the New Mexico State Bar Association met with a dozen
state-wide organizations to discuss possible improvements in the
method of selecting judges. The conference adopted a resolution
favoring non-political selection of judges, but no specific plan was
formulated.2
In 1950, the state bar association approved a draft plan for merit
judicial selection by a near-unanimous vote. The plan was introduced
in the 1951 legislature and defeated on the first vote by a large majority. After a significant amendment 3 the bill passed and joined
seven other proposals submitted to the voters in a special election on
constitutional issues alone. None passed. 4
In 1967, the New Mexico Constitutional Revision Commission
recommended adoption of a plan similar to the one defeated in
1951.6 Both the 1950 plan and the 1967 proposed judicial articles
1. Winters, The New Mexico Judicial Selection Campaign-I Case History, 35 J.
Am. Jud. Soc'y 166, 167 (1952).
2. Id.
3. The original bill provided that an incumbent judge would be defeated for reelection "if a majority of those voting on the question vote against retaining him in
office." The amendment added the words "and if the total number of votes cast on the
question shall be at least fifty per cent of the total number of legal voters voting at
the election." The Albuquerque Tribune and the Santa Fe New Mexican, although both
declared themselves in favor of judicial selection reform, were unable to accept the
amendment which made it virtually impossible to remove a judge from office. At that
time, after forty years of statehood, in only four of all elections held did 50% of the
total voters participate. Nine judges, at that time, had been defeated since statehood
for reelection. Id. at 168, 170-71.
4. The judicial selection proposal fared worst of all proposals submitted to the
voters, with 12,958 "for" to 21,935 "against." The judicial selection proposal did best
generally in concentrations of Anglo-American population, worst in the northern and
central counties where the Spanish-American vote predominated. The Spanish-Americans were apparently swayed by the argument that the new system would eliminate
Spanish-American representation on the bench. The argument made headway, even
though the Santa Fe New Mexican reported that only four of 51 district judges and
one of 24 supreme court judges since statehood had Spanish names, and the situation
could hardly deteriorate under the proposed system. Id. at 169-70.
5. Report of New Mexico Constitutional Revision Commission 85-86 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Commission Report]. Briefly, the 1951 plan provided for a nomination
commission made up of members of the Board of Bar Commissioners for the supreme
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were based on the nonpartisan judicial selection system in effect in
Missouri since 1940, popularly known as the "Missouri Plan." The
idea behind the Missouri Plan is that merit selection of judges is
superior to partisan election. A number of states have agreed with
Missouri, especially in recent years, and have either adopted parts of
it, or have embraced the Plan as a package.' Only eight states remain
with a totally partisan election system for judges.7 New Mexico belongs to this dubious elite.
New constitutions have been approved in a number of states, and
constitutional conventions are pending in Arkansas, Illinois, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and New Mexico." Basic reappraisals of tradition-bound institutions are under way in almost every state of the
Union. Such dramatic changes have taken place in the past few years
that Judge Traynor, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California was prompted to issue a warning:
court. For the district courts, two lawyers and two non-lawyers were to make up the
nominating commission, but the supreme court appointed one of the non-lawyers. The
make-up of the commissions drew criticism, again from the Albuquerque Tribune and
the Santa Fe New Mexican, because "it gives the lawyers too much voice in the selection of judges." Winters, The New Mexico Judicial Selection Campaign, supra note 1,
at 167, 171. Under the new proposal three members of the bar, three non-lawyers appointed by the governor, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Mexico
make up the nominating commission. Commission Report 85. Since the proposal leaves
open the function of the Chief Justice except to designate him chairman of the commission, the make-up of the commission will foreseeably be again subject to the criticism
of giving the lawyers too much voice in the selection of judges. For the history of the
judicial reform movement in New Mexico between 1951 and 1962, see Winters, Judicial
Selection, 1951-1962, 1962 N.M. St. B.J. 19.
6. Ala. Const. amends. LXXXVII, CX; Alaska Const. art. IV, §§ 5-9; Cal. Const.
art. 6, § 26; Ill. Const. art. 5, §§ 10-11; Iowa Const. art. 5, §§ 15-18; Kans. Const. art.
3, § 2, Kans. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-119 to -138 (1964) ; Mo. Const. art. 5, § 29; Neb.
Const. art. 4, § 2, art. 5, §§ 4-5, 7, 10, 15, 20-21; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 791 (1962) ;
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, §§ 571-76 (Supp. 1968). Dade County, Florida, and Denver, Colorado, have also adopted the plan. See Dade County, Fla., Home Rule Charter § 6.01
(1964) ; City and County of Denver, Colo., Home Rule Charter §§ A13.8 to .8-3 (1964).
Governor Scranton of Pennsylvania has taken the initiative and voluntarily appointed
a commission to nominate candidates for Philadelphia judgeships. Executive initiative
has also been taken by Governor Erbe of Iowa, Governor Volpe of Massachusetts, Governor Love of Colorado, Mayor Wagner of New York City, and Mayor Currigan of
Denver, all of whom appointed nominating commissions. See 48 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 117,
154-55, 157 (1965) ; see also Segal, Nonpartisan Selection of Judges: Pennsylvania'sExperiment, 50 A.B.A.J. 830 (1964).
The American Assembly on the Courts has recommended that executives follow merit
plan procedures in exercising appointive powers pending acceptance of the merit plan
by the voters. Recommendations of the 27th American Assembly on the Courts, the
Public and the Law Explosion, 4-9 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 16 (1965).
7. The others are Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,
and West Virginia. Segal, Judicial Selection and the County Bar Associations of Pennsyl'vania, 39 Pa. B. Ass'n Q. 52 (1967).
8. Editorial, Voters Approve Judicial, Constitutional Reforms, 52 Judicature 182,
183 (1968).
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. . [A] glacial force has been gathering momentum against the slag
of years-the force of nationwide legal education, now generally recognized as the best in the world. Young lawyers have come along who
are hospitable to improvement in the judicial process as well as in substantive law, and recent years have been marked by accelerating progress. Woe unto the state that fails to keep up with such progress. The
quality of that state's justice signifies much to others about its education and government, and indeed about its future as a distinguished or
backward member of the family of states.9
*

New Mexico is being offered a golden opportunity to join states
which have brought their method of judicial selection up to date.
The Missouri Plan provides the best known combination of selection
based on merit, along with periodic elections in which incumbents
are required to "run on the record." The New Mexico adaptation of
the Plan, as recommended by the Constitutional Revision Commission, differs in important respects from the Missouri version. 10
Briefly, the Missouri Plan provides for a nonpartisan nominating
commission which screens candidates for judicial positions, and
9. Address by Roger J. Traynor, Virginia State Bar Association Midwinter Meeting, Feb. 10, 1967 in 53 Va. L. Rev. 1266, 1277 (1967). The subject of Judge Traynor's
address included merit judicial selection, which he supports.
10. The proposed sections establishing the merit selection plan in New Mexico are
as follows:
Proposed art. VI, § 11, Judicial Branch.
Filling Vacancies and New Positions.
The governor shall fill a vacancy or any newly created position in any judicial
office in the state, other than that of magistrate, from a list of three nominees presented
to him by the appropriate judicial nominating commission. If the governor should fail
to make an appointment from the list within sixty (60) days from the day it is presented to him by such commission the appointment shall be made by the chief justice or
the acting chief justice of the supreme court from the same list.
Magistrates shall be appointed to fill any newly created positions or vacancies by
the chief justice of the supreme court.
To be eligible to hold office as a justice of the supreme court, judge of the court of
appeals or judge of the district court, a person must be domiciled within the state, a
citizen of the United States, and licensed to practice law before the supreme court of
the state.

Proposed art. VI, § 12, Judicial Branch.
Judicial Nominating Commission.
Three (sic) shall be created a judicial nominating commission for the supreme
court, court of appeals, and a judicial nominating commission for the nomination of
judges for the courts sitting in each judicial geographical department or district. Each
judicial nominating commission shall consist of seven members, one of whom shall be
the chief justice of the supreme court who shall act as chairman. The members of the
bar of the state in the geographical area for which the court or the department or
district of the court sits shall by rule of the supreme court provide for the election of
three of their number to be member(s) of such a commission, and the governor shall
appoint three citizens, not members of the bar, from among the residents of the same
geographical area. The terms of office and compensation for members of a judicial
nominating commission shall be approved by law. No member of a judicial nominating
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chooses the best three for the office in question. The three names are
submitted to the governor, who chooses one. The judge then takes
office, and is required, periodically, to "run on his record" with no
opposition. If he is not reinstated by the voters, the selection process
begins again."
Selection of the nominating commission members under both systems is the same, with the exception that Missouri emphasizes that
the commission is to be nonpartisan, while the New Mexico version
avoids the subject of nonpartisanship entirely.' 2 Each plan selects
three commission members from among members of the bar, and
commission shall hold (office) in any political party or be eligible for appointment to a
state judicial office as long as he is a member of such a commission.
Proposed art. VI, § 13, Judicial Branch.
Term of Office.
The term of office of each justice of the supreme court, district court or court of
appeals, or magistrate, shall expire on the death, retirement or removal of such justice,
judge or magistrate, or upon his rejection by the electorate.
At the next general election following the expiration of four years from the date of
appointment, and thereafter, as hereinafter provided, so long as he retains his office,
every justice, judge and magistrate shall be subject to approval or rejection by the
electorate in such manner as the legislature may provide, every four years in the case
of a magistrate, every six years in the case of a district judge, and every eight years in
the case of justices of the supreme court and judges of the court of appeals. In the case
of a justice of the supreme court, the electorate of the entire state shall vote on the
question of approval or rejection.
In the case of judges of the court of appeals, district court, and magistrates, the
electorate of the district or districts in which the division of the court of appeals or
districts to which he was appointed is located shall vote on the question of approval
or rejection. Any other justices or judges of such other courts as may be created by law
shall be selected and serve such terms as may be prescribed by law.
Proposed art. VI, § 14, Judicial Branch.
Limitations.
No person who holds judicial office in the supreme court, court of appeals, district
court or magistrate court shall engage in the practice of law, hold any other paid office,
position of profit or employment under the state, its civil divisions or the United States,
nor shall he run for elective office other than the judicial office which he holds, or
directly or indirectly make any contributions to, or hold any office in, a political party
or organization, or take part in any political campaign other than for the office which
he holds.
The differences between the proposed sections quoted above and the Missouri version
of the merit plan are explained infra.
11. Mo. Const. art. 5, § 29(d) ; proposed art. VI, § 12, supra note 10. Since the major
motive force behind the drive for merit judicial selection is elimination of partisan
politics from the selection process, it would seem highly appropriate that some mention
be made, in the new section, of the requirement that partisan political considerations are
to be excluded. Missouri mentions the requirement of nonpartisan selection in the title of
section 29, Nonpartisan selection of judges, the title of subsection 29(d), Nonpartisan
judicial commissions, and again in the text of 29(d). This apparently has been found
sufficient protection for the nonpartisanship requirement in Missouri. Colorado favors
bipartisanship as the best way of keeping politics out of the system. See 48 J. Am. Jud.
Soc'y 154 (1964).
12. See notes 10 & 11, supra.
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three non-lawyer members from among the general public by gubernatorial appointment. Missouri, however, provides that:
[T]he terms of office of the members of such commission shall be fixed
by the supreme court and may be changed from time to time, but not
so as to shorten or lengthen the term of any member then in office.
• ..All such commissions shall be administered, and all elections
provided for under this section shall be held and regulated, under such
13
rules as the supreme court shall promulgate.
New Mexico's proposal states only that "the terms of office and
the compensation for members of a judicial nominating commission
shall be as approved by law." 14 Elections of bar members to the commissions are provided for by supreme court rule. Responsibility for
the actual operation of the nominating commissions is left open in
New Mexico, while the supreme court in Missouri must provide procedures to ensure that the commission functions smoothly.
A hard and fast procedure need not be set up in the new constitution. Nevertheless, consistent with efficient management, some
responsibility should be outlined in the constitution. Whether the
supreme court, the governor, or the commission itself is to set procedural guidelines should be clarified. Where is the authority to investigate an applicant's past history, and to call witnesses? Who
determines the scope of inquiry, and whether the completed product
is public or confidential information? The authority merely to nominate candidates without the means by which the commission members can inform themselves about the qualifications of applicants for
judicial positions is an empty one indeed.
The judge under the Missouri system may not "take part in any
political campaign."'" Under the suggested New Mexico provision,
in comparison, the judge may not "take part in any political cam13. Mo. Const. art. 5, § 29(d). Note that Missouri felt that the term of office of
commission members might be used as a pressure point for improper purposes, and
provided that terms of those in office would be protected from changes directed at the
commission member personally. The New Mexico proposed section (Art. VI, § 12, text
supra, at note 10), without protections which Missouri provides, is open to the criticism
that the legislature can vary the terms of any or all members while they are serving.
This is not to say that a real danger to the system exists from this sort of thing. On the
other hand an ounce of prevention would do no harm, and would further assure the
independence of the commissions from political considerations.
14. Proposed art. VI, § 12 srjpra note 10.
15. Mo. Const. art. 5, § 29(f). Prohibition of political activity by judges.
No judge of any court of record in this state, appointed to or retained in
office in the manner prescribed in sections 29(a)-(g), shall directly or indirectly make any contribution to or hold any office in a political party or organization, or take part in any political campaign.
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paign other than for the office which he holds."'" (emphasis supplied) Both Missouri and New Mexico would prohibit direct or
indirect contributions to, or holding office in a political party.
The difficulty with the New Mexico modification of the Missouri
provision is that campaigning for office by the incumbent judge is
sanctioned. The Missouri Plan was drafted with the specific goal of
eliminating the necessity for time-wasting political campaigns by
judges. Campaigns cost money, and the money traditionally comes
from the judge's political party, as well as other sources. Although
the judge may not, under the proposed system, contribute to a political party, there is no mention made of accepting funds from political sources to finance a campaign. The rationale for allowing
incumbents to campaign when, under the merit system, they are unopposed is difficult to understand.
Admittedly there is no positive duty to campaign. But ingrained
habits die slowly, and it is reasonably certain that if the judge is
given the option of a partisan political campaign or no campaign, he
may feel forced, believing the public expects it, to take to the hustings and leave his judicial duties behind.
The aim of the merit plan is to remove partisan politics, as far
as possible, from judicial selection. The impossibility of removing
politics entirely is admitted. Judge Garwood, retired judge of the
Texas supreme court, explains that the "politics" the merit plan
seeks to eliminate are:
• . . certainly not politics in the Aristotelian sense or that of the deep
interest, with which any educated citizen, especially a judge, should
follow and understand political facts, ideas and developments of his
generation. The "politics" sought to be avoided as inconsistent with

the recruitment of the best judiciary and with the best performance of
any judiciary are . . . politics which . . . require judicial incumbents . . . to devote more time and worry than they should to campaign and pre-campaign activities, the details of which are well known
to every holder of elective office and include the solicitation of money
and other assistance from the very people whose cases the incumbent,
17
if successful, may later have to decide.
16. Proposed art. VI, § 14, supra note 10.
17. Garwood, Judicial 'Planned Parenthood,' 26 Tex. B.J. 369-70 (1963). This
article was written in answer to a previous article contending that "politics" in the
broad sense cannot be removed from judicial selection, and stating, "it may be that the
process of refinement that takes place in the political cauldron can be a wholesome ingredient in the judicial personality." Stovall, Judicial Babies and Constitutional Storks,
26 Tex. B.J. 201, 202 (1963).
It should be noted that even in states in which the merit plan has been recommended
and defeated, bar associations are for the most part firmly behind the plan. A poll of
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If the judge is allowed to conduct a political campaign for his
office, the effort to remove partisan politics from judicial selection
will be wasted. The judge's duty of impartiality is difficult enough
without adding unnecessary political considerations.
The merit plan has been in operation in Missouri since 1940. In
1964, approximately 20% of the members of the Missouri bar were
asked their opinion of the merit system. The answer was this:
[A]fter twenty-five years of experience with the merit plan, Missouri
lawyers are for the most part satisfied with this system of selecting
judges. It is particularly significant that the members of the Bar who
have lived with it most closely . . . are its strongest supporters. 18

For selection of circuit judges (equivalent of New Mexico district judges) the Missouri lawyers preferred the merit plan by 61%.
Sixteen percent preferred nonpartisan elections, and 11 % had other
suggestions or expressed no opinion. 19 Only 1 % preferred to see the
governor appoint judges on his own initiative, a practice that commonly occurs in partisan election states like New Mexico.

20

In

Kansas City and St. Louis, where circuit judges are chosen by merit
selection, the Plan is supported by 79% and 70% margins respectively. 21 In addition to a showing of support for the merit plan, the
major impression from the Missouri poll is that Missouri lawyers
Texas judges shows 49.6% for the merit plan, 28.5% for election but for a longer
period, 20% for the present system of partisan elections, and 1.9% for gubernatorial
appointment. Texas had an opportunity to embrace merit selection, but did not take it.
See Henderson & Sinclair, 1 The Selection of Judges in Texas 104 (Public Affairs Research Center, University of Houston, 1965). Florida also turned down merit selection,
over endorsement by the Florida bar. See Editorial, Voters Approve Judicial, Constitutional Reforms, 52 Judicature 182, 183 (1968) ; Citizens and the Courts, 48 J. Am. Jud.
Soc'y 152 (1964).

18. Watson, Missouri Lawyers Evaluate the Merit Plan for Selection and Tenure
of Judges, 52 A.B.A.J. 539, 542 (1966).
19. Id. at 540.

20. In New Mexico, for example, two-thirds of the general trial judges in 1964 had
been originally appointed by the governor. Winters & Allard, Two Dozen Misconceptions about Judicial Selection and Tenure, 48 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 138, 140 (1964). From
1948 to 1957, more than 56% of supreme court judges in elective states came to the
bench by gubernatorial appointment. Id. Pennsylvania, one of the other states which
elects all its judges on a partisan ballot, also had an overwhelming percentage of its

judges initially appointed. Segal, Judicial Selection and the County Bar Associations of
Pennsylvania, 39 Pa. B. Ass'n. Q. 52 (1967). Since 1938 in Georgia, 95% of the appellate judges have been appointed by the governor rather than elected to office. No incumbent appellate judge has been defeated in an election for 45 years. Hall, Merit
Selection and Merit Election of Judges, 4 Ga. St. B.J. 169 (1967). Thus, even in socalled elective states, it is clear that the choice put to the voters is normally a choice of
ratifying the governor's choice or choosing someone else. This is much the same sort of
choice offered the voters under the merit plan, but with merit plan safeguards built in.
21. Watson, supra note 18, at 540.
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overwhelmingly favor divorcing judicial selection from party
politics.
These results after 25 years of experience with the merit plan provide a powerful incentive to adopt the plan in New Mexico. Because
of the unavailability of in-depth studies of the effects of the merit
plan, a certain amount of faith is required that the plan will work
better than the present system of partisan election. The lack of systematic inquiry may be accounted for by the difficulty of measuring
the qualities which separate a good judge from a better one. The
belief of Missouri lawyers that they are getting better judges may
or may not be accepted as indicative of objective fact that better
judges are chosen under the merit system. What is clearly true is that
better judges should be chosen under the merit system, if only from
a common-sense, or even a theoretical, point of view.
The elimination of traditional partisan politics from the judicial
selection process at the very least removes pressures the judge has
heretofore faced. The Missouri experience shows that candidates
who would not otherwise accept a judicial position are willing to be
considered if the political aspects of campaigning and fund-raising
are eliminated. This insures a wider range of candidates. The judicial selection commission is required to choose candidates on principles of merit rather than political appeal to the voters. Disentanglement from political ties encourages independent and impartial attention to the merits of cases. Prohibition of any sort of campaign,
political or otherwise, excludes the time-consuming activities previously required for re-election, allowing complete devotion to duty,
and as an incidental benefit, giving the taxpayer more work for his
money.
In order to enjoy the benefits of merit selection, the entire system
must be nonpartisan. The proposed judicial article does not now require nonpartisan selection by the governor, or nonpartisan selection
by the nominating commission, although the comments to the Revision Commission report
specifically state that the evils of party
22
politics are to be avoided.
The nomination commission should be morally bound to exclude
partisan considerations from their deliberations. The governor will
be responsible to the voters on election day for any partisan transgressions in appointments. Missouri governors have taken the duty
of nonpartisanship seriously. In a strongly Democratic state, of the
60 judges appointed under the merit plan, 70% have been Demo22. "The use of a judicial nominating commission would, it is felt, free the courts
" Comments to Proposed art. VI,
from the undesirable effects of party politics ...
§ 11, supra note 10. Commission Report 84.
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crats, 30% Republicans. 23 There is no reason to suppose that New
Mexico governors will be less responsive to a new constitutional duty
of nonpartisanship.
Under the proposed New Mexico article, the legislature controls
both terms of office and compensation for the members of the nominating commission.24 In view of the Missouri experience with its
legislature,2 5 it might be the better part of valor to ensure at least
the tenure of commission members either by supreme court rule or
by constitutional provision. The danger, if a remote one, is political
control of what must be a nonpartisan commission, deaf to political
considerations. Missouri has been satisfied with control of term of
office and with administration of elections of commission members
by supreme court rule.2 This sort of provision included in the constitution would provide adequate protection from partisan political
pressures.
Perhaps the biggest difference between the suggested New Mexico article and the concept of the Missouri Plan is that New
Mexico would allow campaigns to continue in office by incumbents.
This permission strikes at the very heart of the merit system, which
hypothesizes elimination of partisan politics from judicial selection.
Assuming that the judge feels required to campaign, where does the
money come from? If it comes from the political party coffers, or if
partisan support in various forms is offered, all the pressures sought
to be eliminated reappear. Gone is the desired independence, impartiality and freedom from partisan considerations in judicial
decision-making. Gone, too, is the time sought to be saved by prohibiting campaigns. What of the prospective judicial candidate who
is willing and well-qualified to serve as a judge, but who refuses to
become embroiled in the expense and hardship of a campaign? How
will he react to the option that he may campaign if he desires, but
he need not? The foreseeable indirect pressure to campaign, including the pressure of tradition, may be enough to discourage him from
seeking office in the first instance. Thus we might discourage the very
persons we seek to make a part of a judiciary presently filled with
judges elected under the partisan system.
If there are valid reasons for keeping the judge's privilege to campaign for the office which he holds, that would be a different matter.
23. Watson, supra note 18, at 542 n.16.
24. Proposed art. VI, § 12, supra note 10.
25. The Missouri General Assembly, after 25 years under the merit plan, has failed
to provide the manner of submitting the issue of merit selection to the voters of the
circuits in which it could be adopted. See Mo. Const. art. 5, § 29(b); Belt, Small
County Opposition to the Nonpartisan Court Plan, 22 Mo. B.J. 289 (1966).
26. See Mo. Const. art. 5, § 29(d).
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Under what circumstances would a judge feel compelled to campaign? Hypothetically, an extremely unpopular decision might make
the judge feel the need to campaign. As a practical matter, judges
selected under the merit system are invariably re-elected .2 7 For this
reason, one of the major complaints about the merit system was that
election "on the record" is not likely to remove judges. The Missouri
problem, however, was not with unpopular decisions of the judges,
but with incompetence because of advanced age, and in some cases,
misbehavior.2 In New Mexico, however, other means of dealing
with incompetence and misbehavior are provided.2 Defeat for reelection has not been an adequate safeguard, even under the partisan
elective system. Thus as a practical matter, judges have not been removed from office by the voters for unpopular decisions,8 0 and there
is no need to allow them the privilege of campaigning to protect
themselves from the effects of unpopularity.
There is nothing sacred about partisan election of judges. In 1789,
none of the original states chose their judges by election." Describ27. The Missouri experience has been that judges chosen under merit selection have,
even with periodic submission to the voters, a high degree of job security. A number
of factors contribute to this. First, better judges are probably chosen under the merit
plan. At least an overwhelming number of those connected with the legal profession
consider this to be so. Second, ways of removing unqualified judges by other means
have been made more efficient and responsive to public opinion. Third, voters choose
between approval or rejection, without knowing who will replace the judge they reject
until the governor has approved a commission nomination, which is not made until the
vacancy occurs. Perhaps the uncertainty of the future choice "makes us rather bear
those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of." Hamlet, III, 1. See, e.g.,
Watson, supra note 18; Schroeder & Hall, Twenty-five Year's Experience with Merit
Judicial Selection in Missouri, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 1089, 1094-95 (1966).
Many bar associations across the country have declared themselves in favor of the
merit system as providing better judicial selection. See, e.g., Laub, Issues Before the
Judiciary Committee of the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, 39 Pa. B. Ass'n. Q.
390, 395 (1968) ; Lindsay, The Selection of Judges, 21 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 514, 51617 (1966) ; Roberts, Twenty-five Years under the Missouri Plan, 49 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y
92, 95-96 (1965) ; Citizens and the Courts; Court Modernization Conferences to Continue, 48 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 152 (1964).
28. Watson, supra note 18, at 542.
29. See N.M. Laws 1968, ch. 48, establishing a judicial standards commission and
judicial conference; Proposed art. VI, §§ 15-17, Commission Report 87-89, establishing
a commission on the judiciary for disciplinary and removal purposes.
30. Cf. Watson, supra note 18, at 542. Ordinarily, there is no mention of voters removing judges on election day under the merit system for any reason, much less unpopularity. See, e.g., Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justices-Are They Strainablel', 44
Tex. L. Rev. 1063, 1097 (1966). Rosenberg contrasts the situation in merit selection
states in which judges are returned to office despite political affiliation in Democratic or
Republican landslide years compared to the opposite situation in partisan election states
in which the judges sweep in and out of office, regardless of merit, based on the strength
and direction of the political winds. Id.
31. Hunter, A Missouri Judge Views Judicial Selection and Tenure: Variations
of the Society's Merit Plan, 48 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 126, 129 (1964).
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ing the history of the move toward popular election of judges, one
writer commented:
• . . Mississippi may have been the first to cast "the chances of judi-

cial selection upon the dirty waves of party politics, (but) it was the
New York Constitutional Convention which first imparted respectability to the seductive innovation ...
32

The New York State Bar Association now feels that a return to
the appointive system, specifically the merit selection system is called
for because:
It cannot be denied . . . that the appointive system offers a su-

perior opportunity for ascertaining the merits of a candidate and deliberation upon his qualifications. The appointment can be considered
apart from the excitement and bias of a campaign. .

.

. Candidates

are relieved of the expense of conventions and elections. The legitimate expense of a candidacy under the elective method is very considerable and this expense presents an opportunity for political leaders
to impose high assessments upon candidates for judicial office ...
Men will accept appointment who would
not go through the political
33
servitude now necessary to obtain office.

Long before the controversy over merit judicial selection arose,
Chief Justice Marshall summed up his feelings this way:
The Judicial Department comes home in its effects to every man's fireside; it passes on his property, his reputation, his life, his all. Is it not,
to the last degree important that he (the judge) should be rendered
perfectly and completely independent, with nothing to influence or
control him but God and his conscience? . . . I have always thought,

from my earliest youth till now, that the greatest scourge an angry
Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and 4sinning people, was an
ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent Judiciary.3

Eighteen years ago, New Mexico might have been in the vanguard
of forward-looking states adopting merit selection. That opportunity is past, and the opportunity now presented is that of joining those
progressive states which have chosen merit selection.
BRUCE KEITH
32. Niles, The Popular Election of Judges in Historical Perspective, 21 Record of
N.Y.C.B.A. 523, 527-28 (1966).
33. Quoted in Lindsay, The Selection of Judges, 21 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 514, 51617 (1966).
34. Proceedings of the Virginia State Convention, 1829-30, quoted in O'Donoghue
v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 532 (1932).

